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1. Introduction 
From the foundation of the State until March 1979, the Irish currency 
was maintained in a fixed one-to-one parity with the pound sterling. Aside 
from the 50% deposit requirement on capital inflows through the banking 
system imposed by the Central Bank in recent years, there were no signifi-
cant restrictions on the movement of funds between Ireland and the sterling 
area. Capital movements between Ireland and non-sterling countries were 
subject to exchange control regulations broadly similar to the UK's own, 
although in practice they were administered in a somewhat more liberal 
fashion. The Irish controls could be seen as, in effect, part of the price of 
our membership of the sterling zone, since the UK's own controls would 
have been circumvented very readily if Ireland had presented an uncon-
trolled "window" to the rest of the world. So purchases of financial assets 
in non-sterling countries had to be financed through the dollar premium 
pool or through foreign currency loans. 
In December 1978, in anticipation of Irish entry to the European 
Monetary System, the exchange controls were extended to the United 
Kingdom, which had decided not to join the system. Further Irish invest-
ments in foreign currency securities were prohibited and holders of bank 
accounts in the UK were required to repatriate these funds unless the Central 
Bank permitted them to do otherwise. Existing holders of foreign securities 
could continue to maintain such holdings and, from October 1979, could, 
on the sale of such securities, re-invest the proceeds in any country abroad. 
The Irish controls are described in detail in the manual issued, and 
updated periodically, by the Central Bank. A brief account of the main 
features is given in the Appendix. 
During 1979, a relaxation of the controls was announced which 
permitted life assurance companies and pension funds to invest in foreign 
currency securities up to the point where their foreign holdings reached 
10% of net actuarial liabilities. 
The authors would like to thank, without implicating them, all those who 
were kind enough to comment on earlier drafts, including (5). 
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Nearly all countries operate exchange control systems of one kind or 
another. Some countries, particularly less developed, third world countries 
and those in the Eastern bloc, operate, in peacetime, controls on current as 
well as on capital account movements. As a result, some of their currencies 
are effectively inconvertible for any purpose. In wartime, resort to exchange 
controls is almost universal and amounts to a system of import rationing 
when applied to the current account. Indeed, the UK exchange controls, 
abolished in October 1979, originated in World War II. Extending from 
monetary union at the liberal end to currency inconvertibility in centrally 
planned economies, there is a spectrum of possible exchange control 
regimes from which a country can choose. The choice, for an economy 
heavily engaged in external trade and finance, is an important element in 
iLs uverall .tnacroeconomic policy. 
Prior to December 1978, the Irish exchange control regime involved no 
controls on current account movements and no significant controls on 
capital account movements to the UK. Given the dominance of the UK in 
Ireland's external financial relations, Ireland, in so far as protection of the 
reserves was concerned, might as well have had no exchange controls at all. 
Moreover, given the unhindered access to UK financial markets, the Irish 
private sector enjoyed considerable freedom of action in its external financial 
dealings. The policy currently in force, however, is one of severe controls 
on the outward movement of capital by residents. So there has been a sharp 
movement along the spectrum of exchange control regimes. This may 
appear paradoxical in two respects. It accompanied our entry into a system 
of exchange-rate links designed as a step toward capital market integration 
in Europe. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom, which had previously operated 
a highly restrictive exchange control regime, now has one of the most 
liberal regimes in the world. 
Since the introduction of the new Irish system of exchange controls 
there has been very little public discussion of their economic impact and our 
purpose in this paper is to make a start in that direction. In the next section, 
we attempt to place exchange control policy in context, as just one instru-
ment of overall macroeconomic policy. Since most popular rationalisations 
of exchange controls concentrate on their effects on the level of external 
reserves and on the exchange rate, we begin by considering their role, along 
with the roles of fiscal and monetary policy, under fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes. 
We then go on to consider whether controls may have beneficial effects 
on other economic policy objectives, such as the promotion of employment 
or the expansion of the capital stock. This is followed by an examination of 
the various costs of exchange controls. These include direct administrative 
costs in both the public and private sectors, allocative and distributive 
effects arising from portfolio disequilibrium and the costs of factors of 
production used up in avoiding or evading the controls. The paper concludes 
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with some observations about the appropriateness of the existing exchange 
control system in Ireland. Exchange control is but one of the issues raised 
by our EMS entry. We ignore the broader issues here - a recent discussion 
will be found in (9). 
2. The Macroeconomics of Exchange Controls 
The model of the economy which underlies the analysis of the macro-
economic effects of exchange controls is the standard small open economy 
model. This model has enjoyed increasing popularity in the study of Irish 
macroeconomic policy in recent years. 
Small open economies are likely to behave as price takers in inter-
national goods and capital markets. Unless non-traded goods are a large 
part of total output, under fixed exchange rates the rate of price inflation 
will be determined externally. If there is free mobility of capital, the same 
will be true of interest rates. 
Macro policy operates under particular constraints in this system. 
Money creation derives from two main sources - changes in the level of 
domestic credit and changes in the net external asset position of the banking 
system as a whole. If the domestic creation of money falls short of the 
demand for money, the deficit is made up by capital flows which ensure an 
overall balance of payments surplus, i.e. an increase in the foreign exchange 
reserves. The monetary authority is unable to control the money stock in 
this theoretical model. Changes in the level of domestic credit, which can be 
brought about by the monetary authority, will have no impact on the level 
of demand nor on the rates of lnterest or inflation, but rather on the 
external reserves. 
In the real world, however, neither the goods nor the capital markets 
are as perfect as is assumed in the theoretical model. In particular, restric-
tions on certain types of personal lending by the banking system, and on 
personal instalment credit, are unlikely to be replaced immediately by 
alternative sources of finance in international capital markets. Thus, certain 
types of credit policy could have real effects, at least in the short run, on 
the level of consumer expenditure. But prior to the imposition of exchange 
controls, it was generally agreed that the degree of integration between UK 
and Irish financial markets was so close that these real effects were not 
significant in the aggregate - see Browne and O'Connell (1). Thus, 
monetary policy operated very much as suggested by the theoretical model. 
Although in this model monetary policy has no impact on the major 
aggregates, such as the level of interest rates, the rate of inflation or the 
level of real economic activity, it does have an important effect on the level 
of external reserves. 
In the fixed-exchange rate, small open economy model, the target level 
of foreign exchange reserves can be attained by the pursuit of an appropriate 
policy in regard to domestic credit expansion, without affecting any other 
important aggregate in the system. Thus, any reserves objective implied in 
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the introduction of the controls could equally well have been pursued by an 
appropriate monetary policy without any other macroeconomic implica-
tions, and without any of the costs and distortions associated with exchange 
control. It is on their presumed ability to protect the reserves in the face of 
capital outflows that most rationalisations of the controls rest. 
A reasonably stable overall demand for money is a lynchpin of the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments. If the demand for money 
function is unstable, speculative flows of funds could be so large as to 
require unacceptable shifts in credit policy to protect the reserves. Of 
course, reserves could be temporarily propped up by recourse to the IMF or 
to the international capital market, but it would obviously help the 
argument for exchange controls if serious instability in money demand 
could be established. In a further study, Browne and O'Connell (2) conclude, 
on the basis of extensive econometric tests, that the demand function for 
broad money in Ireland is, in fact, stable, and they go on to interpret this 
finding as support for the applicability of the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments to Irish circumstances. 
Moreover, casual observation suggests that operators in financial 
markets have become increasingly well versed in monetary economics. The 
onset of generalised floating has made the foreign exchange markets riskier 
and there is a tendency for operators to avoid substantial exposures to 
currencies unless they perceive basic inconsistencies between a country's 
macroeconomic policies and its exchange rate position. If this continues, and 
if operators can perceive policy inconsistencies accurately, speculative 
flows will tend to reinforce "genuine" flows and will not be an independent 
source of arbitrary fluctuations in the foreign exchange reserves. 
The efficacy of fiscal policy is also limited in a small open economy. 
While the "crowding out" effects associated with large and relatively closed 
economies are of less importance, the openness of the economy assures that 
fiscal stimuli may leak away through the balance of payments and have only 
a limited impact on domestic output and employment - see McCarthy (7), 
(8). In the limit, with the economy operating at full capacity, the fiscal 
policy multiplier may go to zero. We exclude this possibility in what follows, 
preferring to assume that, in the short-run, activity responds to a demand 
expansion. 
How do we introduce exchange controls into the analysis? Concep-
tually, the easiest way to do so is to assume that the authorities introduce 
such controls as enable them to determine the level of capital flows 
exogenously. The domestic capital markets are now no longer fully 
integrated with their international counterparts and domestic interest rates, 
the fixed exchange rate notwithstanding, can diverge from world rates. We 
are making some polar assumptions here - the controls are across the 
board, affecting all inflows and outflows, and there is no evasion. 
If the authorities now engineer, say, a reduction in the net capital 
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outflow, reserves and the money supply both rise; interest rates must fall 
and domestic demand will rise, resulting in an increased level of economic 
activity but a worsening of the balance of payments on current account. 
The process continues until activity has expanded sufficiently, and interest 
rates have fallen enough, to worsen the current account in an amount equal 
to the initial reduction in the net capital outflow. The reserves will stabilise 
and so will money supply. 
At first blush, it might appear that the authorities have done rather 
well, increasing the level of economic activity and, thus, accommodating an 
increased demand for money at a higher level of the external reserves. The 
extent to which they can continue with the policy is limited by the size of 
initial capital outflows and the lower limits on interest rates - if you wish, 
on the supply schedule of foreign funds. As is well known, this latter con-
sideration is also important in regard to traditional fiscal policy. An 
increase in government expenditure will raise demand, hence imports and 
hence the current account balance of payments deficit. But the demand for 
money is higher so reserves rise, capital inflows making up the difference. 
The fiscal expansion is not always feasible - the process stops when the 
supply of foreign funds ceases to be elastic at the (in this case) given 
interest rate. The main difference between the two policies, in qualitative 
terms, is that fiscal expansion does not move the interest rate from the 
world level, while exchange controls, where they are effective, will do so. 
Such a movement is not necessarily desirable. 
The manner in which we have introduced exchange controls into the 
analysis thus far does not correspond to the exchange control regime 
operated at present by the Irish authorities. The controls do not apply to all 
capital flows: there are no restrictions on inflows and the controls on 
outflows apply only to Irish residents. There are no regulations preventing 
leading and lagging through the current account. Thus, the Irish capital 
market is far from perfectly insulated from overseas markets. But the 
qualitative impact of the controls should be the same as in the analysis just 
given, even if their quantitative importance is reduced by limitations in 
coverage and by avoidance and evasion. 
The break with sterling has altered the framework of Irish macro-
economic policy in certain ways, but we are still participating in a pegged 
exchange rate system, considering the small margin of fluctuation within the 
EMS parity grid. 
The policy environment changes for a small open economy if it adopts 
a policy of flexible exchange rates. In particular, monetary expansion can 
now have only one source, domestic credit expansion, and can, therefore, 
be controlled by the monetary authority. Price inflation will no longer be 
entirely externally determined, even though the economy is still a price 
taker on world markets. Changes in the exchange rate, reflecting mainly 
domestic monetary policy actions, will now translate the prevailing external 
rate of inflation into an endogenous domestic rate. 
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There is less agreement amongst commentators on the efficacy of 
monetary and fiscal policies in this environment than in the fixed exchange 
rate case - see the discussions in (3), (6), (10) and (11). However, it is 
plausible that monetary policy will have its main impact on the exchange 
rate and the price level, with limited real effects working through changes 
in asset values. Fiscal expansion, unless the economy is fully employed, 
will raise demand and activity and, hence, the demand for money. This, 
with reserves frozen, can have the apparently anomalous effect of 
appreciating the exchange rate, but this is really no more anomalous than 
the impact of fiscal expansion on reserves in the fixed exchange rate case. 
What happens when exchange controls are introduced? We are now 
starting from a position where capital flows precisely offset the current 
account balance of payments deficit. The impact effect of exchange controls 
will be to create an incipient overall balance of payments surplus which puts 
upward pressure on the exchange rate. This, in turn, reduces prices and 
consequently the demand for money. This reduces interest rates and expands 
the level of activity until the balance of payments deficit on current account 
rises sufficiently to offset the increased capital flows. 
The effects of exchange controls under flexible exchange rates are not 
dissimilar to what happens in the fixed exchange rate case. In particular, the 
impacts which exchange controls can have on macroeconomic magnitudes 
could equally well be achieved by the appropriate choice of fiscal and 
monetary policies. 
3. Further Economic Impacts of Exchange Controls 
The notion that attempts to increase the stock of financial assets in 
a country are economically desirable goes back at least to the mercantilists 
and has appeared in the Irish debate on economic policy under such guises 
as the periodic calls to "repatriate" the external reserves documented in 
Fanning (4). 
It is difficult to see how objectives, such as the expansion of the capital 
stock or the promotion of employment, are rendered any easier of attain-
ment through the introduction of exchange controls. Even if domestic 
residents increased investment, in response to reduced borrowing rates 
consequent on the controls, unless the marginal efficiency of capital had 
been increased, something which controls do nothing to encourage, the 
resulting level of investment would be above the social optimim. But in a 
country dependent on external finance for investment, things might not 
work out like this at all. 
The attractiveness of Ireland as an investment location to a multi-
national company depends on the expected real rate of return on Irish versus 
alternative investments, which is not directly affected by exchange controls 
at all. · 
The supply schedule of foreign funds could be shifted in an adverse 
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direction if foreign investors feared further extensions of controls, limiting 
their freedom to liquidate investments and to repatriate profits. But this is 
hardly likely to be a problem in the Irish case, given ou.r commitments on 
capital movements under obligations to the IMF, OECD and EEC. 
As to employment, there can be no doubt that exchange controls 
create jobs. Whether this is a sensible way to do so is another matter. In the 
Central Bank, as well as in the commercial banks and in private business, 
considerable numbers of additional staff are now employed as a result of 
exchange controls. Precise information is not available, but estimates of the 
numbers involved run to several hundred. The creation of employment, 
whether in the public or in the private sector, which results in no increased 
output of useful goods and services, is essentially redistributive rather than 
productive, and, in our view, has little to recommend it as an element in 
employment policy. It is sometimes argued that fully effective exchange 
controls could, through insulating the domestic financial markets totally 
from outside influence, render monetary policy effective for economic 
stabilisation, even under fixed exchange rates. The possibility seems remote 
under the present Irish arrangements, however: the controls are limited in 
coverage and their effectiveness presumably less than total. To create a role 
for monetary policy in a fixed exchange rate open economy of similar 
importance to its role in a closed economy would virtually require the 
abandonment of convertibility. In any event, monetary policy autonomy is 
not an end in itself and the availability of alternative stabilisation policy 
instruments must place a strict limit on the price one would be willing to 
pay for it. 
4. The Costs of Exchange Controls 
a. Direct Resource Costs 
The direct costs of exchange controls are the opportunity costs of the 
factors of production tied up in operating the system. The authorities bear 
some of these costs but the major proportion is presumably borne by 
business. As well as factor costs, there are delays in form-filling and process-
ing through banks or authorised agents before "genuine" movements of 
funds are sanctioned by the Central Bank. These costs are difficult to 
quantify in the absence of a comprehensive survey of commerce and 
industry. But they can hardly be trivial, given the extent of the controls and 
the size of Ireland's foreign trade. 
Prior to the break with sterling, almost one-half of Ireland's external 
trade in goods and services and an even larger proportion of Ireland's external 
financial dealings, representing the UK's share in these areas, could be 
conducted as easily, for practical purposes, as if they were internal deals in 
Irish pounds. Exchange control costs, in addition to the (unavoidable, given 
the end of the sterling link) costs of currency conversion must now be 
incurred in respect of all overseas transactions on both current and capital 
account. 
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In addition to the direct costs of operating the system of exchange 
controls, there are hidden costs in the form of the resources devoted to 
avoidance and evasion. It has been argued that the effectiveness of any 
exchange control regime depends on the willingness and ability of the 
authorities to tighten the regulations at as fast a rate as the private sector 
discovers new loopholes. 
b. Allocative and Distributional Costs 
Exchange controls of their very nature must impose costs on the 
owners of asset portfolios, since the essence of exchange controls of the 
type Ireland has adopted is to intervene in the asset-selection decisions of 
these portfolio owners. 
Under fixed exchange rates, the immediate impact of the controls is to 
re-allocate the community's holdings of foreign assets away from the private 
sector and into the official external reserves. If there is any tendency for the 
return earned on official foreign asset holdings to be lower than would be 
obtained by the private sector, there is a loss of foreign earnings to the 
community. Given that Central Banks tend to hold short-dated, or com-
pletely liquid, assets, which usually yield lower returns, and given the 
conservative approach which they normally adopt to portfolio management, 
such a tendency is probable. 
However, the increase in external reserves is less than the reduction in 
foreign holdings of the private sector, due to the increased balance of 
payments deficit on current account. Overall holdings of foreign assets are 
reduced, but the reduction in borrowing rates discussed earlier will see an 
increase in domestic investment expenditure. The re-allocation of the 
community's total capital portfolio from foreign to domestic assets will 
reduce the total income flow from these assets, since lower-yielding 
domestic assets have been substituted for the foreign ones. 
In a world of competitive markets, investment expenditure is under-
taken up to the point where the marginal efficiency of investment equals 
the opportunity cost of capital. If social and private returns are equal, this 
results in a socially optimal level of the capital stock. The social opportunity 
cost of capital is the world market rate of return. By depressing domestic 
yields below this point, exchange controls will result in a level for the 
· capital stock that is not the social optimum. 
It can immediately be objected that we do not live in a world of 
perfectly competitive markets. All sorts of externalities and distortions 
serve to ensure that social and private returns do, in fact, diverge. However, 
if exchange controls of the Irish type were to be a possible remedy, it would 
be necessary to prove that the net effect of the distortions was such as to 
hold domestic investment below the social optimum - otherwise, controls 
on outflows would exacerbate the problem. Moreover, the distortions 
would have to affect international, relative to domestic, capital, and not just 
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the overall attractiveness of investment. Even if these conditions could be 
shown to hold, remedies other than exchange controls could be the most 
suitable. 
The reduction in domestic yields, brought about by the introduction of 
effective exchange controls, will cause a redistribution from savers to 
borrowers. Some of the benefit goes to the public sector in the form of 
increased profits for the Central Bank - the increase in the reserves will be 
held in the form of interest-bearing assets, matched, at least to some extent, 
by non-interest-bearing currency liabilities. One wonders whether a 
redistribution from savers to borrowers is deemed desirable in its own right 
by the authorities. 
The Irish economy is characterised by large-scale public and foreign 
ownership of the industrial capital stock. As a result, the market capitalisa-
tion of Irish equities (some of the largest quoted companies being in the 
financial sector to boot) is only about £900m. This is a far smaller propor-
tion of the nation's capital stock than is represented by quoted securities in 
other countries. Domestic financial institutions which wish to hold equities 
in their portfolios must, in practice, seek most of them abroad in these 
circumstances. While many institutions will, for prudential reasons, wish 
to match their, mainly domestic, liabilities with assets of the same currency 
denomination, it remains the case that any given· system of restrictions on 
outward portfolio investment would be less of a burden in a country with a 
more developed equity market. 
There is a prohibition on the transacting of forward exchange rate 
cover for deals not related to trade. Since forward rates reflect interest rate 
differentials, portfolio investors can get exposure in overseas markets, 
through local financing, at costs which can differ very little from those 
which would prevail in the absence of this regulation. But it must discourage 
Irish business from borrowing abroad, through preventing the off-loading· of 
currency risk, and to that extent is likely to increase the severity for the 
private sector of any given degree of quantitative credit restriction. 
5. The Effectiveness of the Irish Controls 
It is always difficult to quantify the extent to which evasion can 
frustrate the effectiveness of an exchange control system. This is not so 
much a problem with avoidance, i.e., with legitimate methods of effecting 
capital flows. 
Non-residents are not subject to the Irish exchange control restrictions. 
Data on asset-ownership by residence are poor. However, it is probable that 
total non-resident ownership of fairly liquid assets ( deposits, gilts and quoted 
equities) would be of the same order of magnitude (£1,000m.) as the foreign 
exchange reserves. The liquidation of these assets could not be prevented at 
all. It is possible that the introduction of controls might see foreign portfolio 
investors squeezed out by domestic investors at the margin, with a reduction 
in the extent in which portfolios are diversified internationally. 
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Moreover, there are no controls on the current account of the balance 
of payments, so currency speculation could take the form of accelerating or 
delaying payments for imports and exports. This "leading and lagging" is 
of great potential importance in a country with such a large external trading 
involvement as Ireland. The total of Ireland's imports and exports for 1980 
is for~cast at above £10bn. If a one-month delay in the realisation of export 
receipts coincided with a one-month acceleration· of import payments, 
external reserves would almost be wiped out. Finally, residents who are 
subject to strict controls on capital exports can always attempt to evade them. 
In the course of his opening statement in the debate on interest rates 
in Dail Eireann on Wednesday, April 16th, 1980, the Minister for Finance 
remarked: 
"This is an appropriate point to mention the exchange controls, which, 
though they afford a degree of protection, cannot insulate us from 
external influences. Exchange controls relate to capital movements. 
Leads and lags in relation to payment for our trade, even in relation to 
one month's transactions could, on their own, exceed the total level of 
official external reserves. 
As regards financial transactions, exchange controls do not and 
cannot relate to non-residents who have large balances and holdings of 
financial and other assets within the State, all of which could be run 
down at their wish. 
As regards residents, they have large liabilities to abroad and could 
run them down without being restricted by exchange control, which 
must allow residents to pay their debts abroad. In addition, exchange 
control cannot force residents to borrow abroad and it may very well 
be that, as in this year, we need the private sector as well as the Govern-
ment to effect significant capital inflows." 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in the event of serious 
downward pressure on the exchange rate, the Irish system of exchange 
controls would be of strictly limited effectiveness in conserving the official 
holdings of foreign exchange. 
Through the intervention arrangements of the European Monetary 
System, Ireland now has access to, in principle, unlimited foreign exchange 
support from its partner-states, in addition to its entitlements to drawings 
from the International Monetary Fund. So the wherewithal to resist what 
the authorities believed to be an ill-founded speculative raid is already 
available. One of the lessons of the postwar experience with fixed exchange 
rate systems is that resistance to what one believes to be well-founded 
speculation is both expensive and, ultimately, pointless. 
The present Irish system of exchange controls dates from the period 
of transition from membership of the sterling area to a new exchange rate 
regime. That transition has now been accomplished and the issue we wish 
to raise in this article is whether or not we should continue with the controls 
now in force. 
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If monetary and fiscal policies can be geared to consistency with the 
exchange rate target, there should be no need for exchange controls. In the 
event that perfect consistency is not attained, and of course it never will be, 
fluctuations in the reserves will result. But that is their function, and is the 
principal reason for holding them in the first instance. 
With monetary and fiscal policies which are not consistent with the 
exchange rate, it is extremely doubtful if exchange controls can do any 
more than postpone the day of reckoning. These controls are costly to 
operate and do not appear to generate any indirect benefits. 
In these circumstances, we conclude that exchange control should not 
be a permanent feature of Irish macroeconomic policy. 
APPENDIX 
(The following account of the Irish Exchange Control arrangements is taken 
from the OECD Economic Survey of Ireland, August 1979, Annex 1. Note 
that the UK's exchange controls have since been abolished, so there is no 
longer an investment currency market.) 
System prior to 18th December 1978 
Prior to 18th December 1978, Ireland and the United Kingdom (for 
exchange control purposes, Northern Ireland, Great Britain, the Channel 
Islands, the Isle of Man and Gibralter) operated broadly similar exchange 
controls vis-a-vis residents of third countries (termed non-residents) while, 
in general, maintaining complete freedom of capital movements between 
each other's residents. The Irish controls were, however, somewhat more 
liberal in a number of respects than their United Kingdom counterparts. 
In brief, trade and other current transactions (including travel) and 
outward direct investment in and personal capital movements to other EEC 
member states, were subjected only to supervisory controls. These controls 
were applied solely for the purpose of ensuring the bona fides of the 
transactions concerned. Allowances were available for personal capital 
movements outside the EEC, while outward direct investment transactions 
outside the EEC were dealt with on their merits. Outward portfolio invest-
ment was allowed through the medium of the investment currency market. 
The investment currency market operated as a medium through which Irish 
residents could buy foreign currency to invest in foreign securities from other 
Irish or U .K. resident sellers of such securities. The currency, in general, 
sold at a substantial premium over the official rate of exchange. The 
currency was also available for outward direct investment transactions in 
and personal capital movements to countries outside the EEC in excess of 
the basic allowances available. Irish residents were not allowed to retain 
foreign currency on deposit or lend Irish pounds to non-residents except 
with the permission of the Central Bank. There were, in general, no 
exchange controls on capital inflows. 
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Changes introduced with effect from 18th December 1978 
On 15th December 1978, in light of Ireland's prospective membership 
of the EMS, exchange controls were applied for the first time to transactions 
by Irish residents with residents of the United Kingdom. The controls were 
intended to limit the possibility of disruptive capital movements emerging 
in the context of Irish membership of the EMS. Broadly speaking, the 
controls now applied to transactions with residents of the United Kingdom 
are the same as had already applied to transactions with other EEC member 
states. 
The system as it now stands includes a number of additional changes 
made in January 1979. Thus, although Irish resident holders may continue 
to switch holdings of foreign securities eligible for sale in the investment 
currency market, they may not buy additional investment currency. 
Investment currency is no longer available, therefore, for the purchase of 
additional foreign securities or for outward direct investment transactions 
in or personal capital movements to countries outside the EEC. Irish 
residents have also been required to repatriate bank balances in the United 
Kingdom, unless permission to retain them has been obtained. Furthermore, 
a number of supervisory controls on capital inflows have been introduced, 
but there are no restrictions on such inflows. 
As the United Kingdom has not applied exchange controls to trans-
actions with Ireland, existing arrangements to ensure that Ireland is not used 
as a channel to evade United Kingdom controls continue to apply. 
Controls now operating 
There are no restrictions on current trading or invisible transactions. 
Apart from small transactions, however, foreign currency for payments 
must be obtained through the authorised banks. Export proceeds must be 
repatriated without delay. 
Personal capital movements to EEC member states are only subject to 
supervisory controls. Allowances are available in respect of most personal 
capital movements outside the EEC. The purchase of personal property 
outside the EEC may be financed with borrowed foreign currency repayable 
with official exchange in instalments over five years. 
Outward direct investment in the EEC is also only subject to super-
visory control. Outward direct investment projects in other countries are 
dealt with on their merits. In general, an appropriate amount of the 
financing of approved projects is with foreign currency borrowing. Inward 
direct investment is supervised but there are no restrictions. 
Apart from investment by institutions with borrowed foreign currency 
no new outward portfolio investment in foreign securities is allowed. 
Existing holdings of such securities may, however, be retained and may, 
subject to certain conditions, be switched for similar securities. Such 
securities may also be sold to non-residents 'and the proceeds repatriated. 
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There are no restrictions on inward portfolio investment. Payment for Irish 
securities purchased by non-residents must be in foreign currency or its 
equivalent. Transactions above a certain value are supervised. 
Irish residents may borrow foreign currency from authorised banks for 
direct financing of trade. Central Bank approval is required for non-trade 
foreign currency borrowing but is generally granted for productive purposes. 
Except in some minor cases, authorised banks are not allowed to lend Irish 
pounds to non-residents without Central Bank approval. 
Irish residents may not hold foreign currency accounts except with 
the permission of the Central Bank. Permission is generally given where 
accounts are required for commercial or, in certain cases, personal reasons. 
There are no restrictions on inflows into non-resident Irish pound accounts. 
However, for supervisory purposes, credits to such accounts above certain 
values require permission. Furthermore, the open positions of banks in 
foreign currencies are controlled in certain respects. 
Authorised banks may provide forward cover to residents and to 
non-resident banks for transactions directly related to the movement of 
goods and related services between Ireland and any other country, subject to 
documentary evidence being obtained for each transaction. The provision 
of forward cover is . also subject to conditions relating to the timing and 
amount of transactions. 
Administration of exchange control 
Day to day administration of exchange control is carried out by the 
Central Bank of Ireland which acts under delegated authority from the 
Minister for Finance. The Central Bank, in turn, has delegated authority to 
authorised banks, and to a lesser extent, approved agents (stockbrokers, 
travel agents, etc. ) to approve most current and some capital payments. 
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